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Abstract
This paper aims to shed light on the characteristics and particularly the determinants of credit-less
recoveries. After building a dataset and documenting some stylised facts of credit-less recoveries
in emerging market economies, this paper uses panel probit models to analyse key determinants of
credit-less recoveries. Our main ﬁndings are the following. First, our frequency analysis conﬁrms
earlier ﬁndings that credit-less recoveries are not at all rare events. Moreover, our analysis shows
that the frequency of credit-less recoveries doubles after a banking or currency crisis. Second, results
from estimated panel probit models suggest that credit-less recoveries are typically preceded by large
declines in economic activity and ﬁnancial stress, in particular if private sector indebtedness is high
and the country is reliant on foreign capital inﬂows. Finally, we ﬁnd that the predicted probability
of a credit-less recovery in central and eastern European EU Member States during the coming years
varies across countries, but is relatively high in the Baltic States.
JEL classiﬁcation: C23; C25; E32; E51; G01
Keywords: Credit-less Recoveries, Financial Crises, Panel Probit Models.5
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Non-technical summary
During the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, several countries in central
and eastern Europe experienced drastic declines in international trade and capital ﬂows,
which were followed by large contractions in economic activity. The global ﬁnancial and
economic crisis had a relatively strong impact on these countries, as their preceding eco-
nomic expansion had been ﬁnanced by relying heavily on cross-border capital ﬂows. Once
risk aversion towards the region increased and ﬁnancing conditions tightened, the region’s
macroeconomic imbalances made these countries highly vulnerable and required far-reaching
macroeconomic adjustments. Now that these adjustment processes are coming to an end in
many of these countries, the question arises what the post-crisis recovery phase could look
like and what the role of credit would be in such a recovery.
This paper aims to shed light on the characteristics and particularly the determinants
of credit-less recoveries, which are recoveries in output without a pick-up in credit. Such
recoveries are atypical, as in ”normal” recoveries output and credit growth tend to be cor-
related (as suggested, for example, by the theory on ﬁnancial accelerators). After building
a dataset and documenting some stylised facts of credit-less recoveries in emerging market
economies, this paper uses panel probit models to analyse key determinants of credit-less
recoveries. After estimating and comparing various panel probit models, we apply our
preferred model to predict the probability of credit-less recoveries in central and eastern
European EU Member States in the coming years.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. First, our frequency analysis conﬁrms earlier ﬁnd-
ings that credit-less recoveries are not at all rare events. In our sample of low and middle
income economies one out of four recoveries in output occurs without a pick-up in credit.
Moreover, our analysis shows that the frequency of credit-less recoveries doubles after a
banking or currency crisis. Second, panel probit models suggest that credit-less recoveries
are typically preceded by large declines in economic activity and ﬁnancial stress, in particu-
lar if private sector indebtedness is high and the country is reliant on foreign capital inﬂows.
This suggests that ﬁnancial frictions may indeed play a key role in the stagnation of credit
despite that output recovers. Third and ﬁnally, our models suggest that (assuming that the
trough in output was reached in 2009) the probability of a credit-less recovery in central
and eastern European EU Member States during the coming years varies across countries,6
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but is relatively high in the Baltic States.
Our ﬁndings have the following implications. They suggest that a recovery in output
following a recession associated with ﬁnancial stress may not be accompanied by a pick-up in
lending. New credit may thus not be a necessary condition for output to recover. This does
not mean, however, that credit is irrelevant for a recovery in output. Credit-less recoveries
tend to be relatively weak and other related research (e.g. Kannan (2010)) shows that
stressed credit conditions contribute to the sluggishness of these recoveries. To the extent
that bottlenecks in the supply of credit play a role, policy measures aimed at supporting
the ﬁnancial intermediation process may help the recovery in output. Such policy measures
should not only focus on the ﬁnancial sector, but also concentrate on restoring conﬁdence
among lenders and savers. A credible ﬁscal consolidation strategy and structural reforms
aimed at correcting the root causes of the macroeconomic imbalances built up in previous
years should play a key role in this regard. Even more important are pre-emptive policies
aimed at avoiding the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances.7
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1 Introduction
During the global ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, several countries in central
and eastern Europe experienced drastic declines in international trade and capital ﬂows,
which were followed by large contractions in economic activity. The global ﬁnancial and
economic crisis had a relatively strong impact on these countries, as their preceding eco-
nomic expansion had been ﬁnanced by relying heavily on cross-border capital ﬂows. Once
risk aversion towards the region increased and ﬁnancing conditions tightened, the region’s
macroeconomic imbalances made these countries highly vulnerable and required far-reaching
macroeconomic adjustments. Now that these adjustment processes are coming to an end in
many of these countries, the question arises what the post-crisis recovery phase could look
like and what the role of credit would be in such a recovery.
A growing body of empirical and theoretical research focuses on economic recoveries
after ﬁnancial crises, e.g., Cerra and Saxena (2008), Kannan (2010), Abiad et al. (2011),
Coricelli and Roland (2011). A stylised fact from the emerging market literature is that,
after sudden stops in capital ﬂows, output can recover with virtually no pick-up in external
or domestic credit. Calvo et al. (2006a and b) were the ﬁrst to document such recoveries in
emerging market economies, which they characterise as Phoenix Miracles (as output ”rises
from its ashes” without help from credit). They ﬁnd that after so-called systemic sudden
stop episodes (deﬁned as a sharp fall in capital inﬂows accompanied by unusually large bond
spreads), output tends to return relatively quickly to pre-crisis levels, but with virtually no
recovery in external or domestic credit and investment remains weak. They attribute this to
the existence of ﬁnancial frictions, which imply that ﬁrms can obtain short-term ﬁnancing
for working capital but cannot obtain long-term ﬁnancing for physical capital.
In order to explain the apparent paradox of rebounding growth without credit, Biggs
et al. (2009) use a (closed economy) model to show that it is the change in the ﬂow of credit
that matters for GDP growth after a ﬁnancial crisis rather than the ﬂow of credit itself.
Recoveries in output can thus occur already when credit growth stops dropping, even if the
rate of credit growth remains negative. Biggs et al. (2009) deﬁne a credit-less recovery as
a recovery in output without a pick-up in the growth rate of credit (instead of the level
of credit as deﬁned by Calvo et al. (2006a and b) and Abiad et al. (2011)). The analysis
by Biggs et al. (2009) oﬀers additional insights into the drivers of output growth following8
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ﬁnancial crises, but is not inconsistent with the notion of credit-less recoveries as deﬁned in
this paper. A key point in the paper by Biggs et al. (2009) is that the link between GDP
and credit is diﬀerent in recovery periods characterised by ﬁnancial volatility as opposed to
”normal” times. During the latter, both the level and the change in credit growth matter
for output growth, whereas in periods of higher ﬁnancial volatility credit growth loses its
signiﬁcance as a driver of output growth.
Based on a comparison between credit-less and normal recoveries, Abiad et al. (2011)
ﬁnd that one in ﬁve recoveries is credit-less (based on a sample of advanced, emerging and
lower income countries). If a systemic sudden stop is also accompanied by a banking crisis,
however, the vast majority of recoveries (around 80%) are credit-less. Moreover, Abiad
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that credit-less recoveries tend to be relatively weak and output growth
is on average a third lower than in normal recoveries. Analysing the reasons for these
diﬀerences, they conclude that impaired ﬁnancial intermediation is the key factor driving
these diﬀerences as recoveries without credit tend to be preceded by events that are likely
to disrupt the supply of credit (such as banking crises or credit booms). This explanation
is supported by their ﬁnding that industries that are more reliant on external ﬁnance seem
to grow disproportionately less during credit-less recoveries (see also Kannan (2010)).
Focusing on the channels that enable the economy to recover without credit, Coricelli and
Roland (2011) ﬁnd that alternative sources of ﬁnancing, such as trade credit, a reallocation
to less credit-dependent sectors or the take-up of unused production capacity can help ﬁrms
to raise their output despite tight credit conditions. Their ﬁndings show that industries
that are more dependent on trade credit as opposed to bank credit recover more quickly
as these industries are less vulnerable to prolonged credit market disruptions. The ability
of ﬁrms to substitute trade credit for bank credit turns out to be even more important for
output during credit-less recoveries, giving support to the view that credit-less recoveries
are a response to disruptions in the supply of bank credit. Firm-level data conﬁrm the
importance of alternative sources of ﬁnancing beyond bank credit for the ability of ﬁrms to
raise their output after a ﬁnancial crisis (Brown et al. (2010)).
Building in particular on Abiad et al. (2011), this paper aims to shed further light on
the characteristics and especially the determinants of credit-less recoveries. More speciﬁ-
cally, after building a dataset and documenting some stylised facts of credit-less recoveries9
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in emerging market economies, this paper uses panel probit models to analyse key determi-
nants of credit-less recoveries. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to systematically
study the determinants of credit-less recoveries using such models. After estimating and
comparing various panel probit models, we apply our preferred model to predict the prob-
ability of credit-less recoveries in central and eastern European EU Member States in the
coming years.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. First, our frequency analysis conﬁrms that credit-
less recoveries are not at all rare events. In our sample of low and middle income economies
one out of four recoveries in output occurs without a pick-up in credit. Average output
growth during the ﬁrst year of a credit-less recovery is a half lower than in recoveries with
credit. Moreover, our analysis shows that the frequency of credit-less recoveries doubles
after a banking or currency crisis. Second, our panel probit models suggest that credit-less
recoveries are typically preceded by large declines in economic activity and ﬁnancial stress,
in particular if private sector indebtedness is high and the country is reliant on foreign
capital inﬂows. This suggests that ﬁnancial frictions may indeed play a key role in the
stagnation of credit despite that output recovers. Third and ﬁnally, our models suggest
that (assuming that the trough in output was reached in 2009) the probability of a credit-
less recovery in central and eastern European EU Member States during the coming years
varies across countries, but is relatively high in the Baltic States.
Our ﬁndings have the following implications. They suggest that a recovery in output
following a recession associated with ﬁnancial stress may not be accompanied by a pick-up in
lending. New credit may thus not be a necessary condition for output to recover. This does
not mean, however, that credit is irrelevant for a recovery in output. Credit-less recoveries
tend to be relatively weak and other related research (e.g. Kannan (2010)) shows that
stressed credit conditions contribute to the sluggishness of these recoveries. To the extent
that bottlenecks in the supply of credit play a role, policy measures aimed at supporting
the ﬁnancial intermediation process may help the recovery in output. Such policy measures
should not only focus on the ﬁnancial sector, but also concentrate on restoring conﬁdence
among lenders and savers. A credible ﬁscal consolidation strategy and structural reforms
aimed at correcting the root causes of the macroeconomic imbalances built up in previous
years should play a key role in this regard.10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1358
June 2011
Although the conclusions in this study are based on robust, empirical regularities, it
needs to be borne in mind that every recovery phase has its own idiosyncratic features. In
central and eastern Europe, such features may stem from the speciﬁc institutional envi-
ronment associated with EU membership and the very high degree of ﬁnancial integration
between these countries and other EU Member States. On the one hand, tight links be-
tween international parent banks and their subsidiaries in the central and eastern European
region may reduce ﬁnancing constraints more than historical post-crisis recoveries in emerg-
ing markets suggest. On the other hand, such tight links could also imply a larger risk of
contagion, thereby worsening ﬁnancing constraints for countries in central and Eastern Eu-
rope. How these factors work out on balance depends in particular on banks’ willingness
and ability to maintain their exposures to the region during and in the aftermath of the
global ﬁnancial crisis.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and the deﬁnition of
credit-less recoveries. Moreover, some stylised facts regarding recoveries without credit are
documented. Section 3 discusses the panel probit model and the explanatory variables used.
Section 4 shows the empirical results obtained. In Section 5 the predictive performance of
the estimated model is evaluated and predictions for central and eastern European EU
Member States are presented. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Stylised Facts
2.1 Identiﬁcation of credit-less Recoveries
As our main interest is in understanding possible recovery patterns in emerging economies
in central and eastern Europe, we exclude advanced economies from our sample. The
dataset consists of an unbalanced panel for 86 middle and low income countries from Latin
America, Asia, Africa, central and eastern Europe and the Caribbean. The data are mainly
obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. The time span ranges
from 1970-2009, although data availability reduces it for many countries. To identify credit-
less recoveries in our sample we use real GDP (i.e., GDP divided by the GDP deﬂator),
and real private credit (i.e., credit to the private sector divided by the GDP deﬂator). For
these variables the minimum number of available periods for a country is 8, the maximum11
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# Deﬁnition
1 3 years of consecutive neg. annual real credit growth after the trough
2 2 years of consecutive neg. annual real credit growth after the trough
3 neg. average real credit growth for the 3 years following the trough
4 neg. average real credit growth for the 2 years following the trough
5 level of real credit is higher in the trough year (t) than in t+3
6 level of real credit is higher in the trough year (t) than in t+2
Table 1: Deﬁnitions of Credit-less Recoveries
number is 40 and the average is 30 for a total of 2578 observations.
The precise deﬁnition of a credit-less recovery inevitably requires some judgement, for
example regarding the identiﬁcation of a recovery in output and how we deﬁne ”credit-less”.
Our approach follows the earlier literature in this regard, but we also check the sensitivity of
our results for diﬀerent deﬁnitions. Credit-less recoveries are identiﬁed in a similar fashion
as in Abiad et al. (2011). First, we determine economic downturns based on ﬂuctuations
of annual real GDP according to Braun and Larrain (2005). More speciﬁcally, troughs
are identiﬁed as years when cyclical GDP is more than one standard deviation below zero.
Cyclical GDP is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the logarithm of real GDP and a trend
computed by the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter1. In the case of consecutive troughs we choose the
one with the lowest cyclical GDP. Moreover, we do not identify troughs in the ﬁrst two
years of data availability and in the years 2008 and 2009. Then, a recession is dated as
starting the year following the previous peak of cyclical GDP and as ending the year of the
trough.
Second, we identify credit-less recoveries. More speciﬁcally, let us denote the year of the
trough as t. The onset of a recovery is deﬁned as the period following the trough, i.e., t+1.
Then, we identify credit-less recoveries according to six diﬀerent deﬁnitions (see Table 1).
In the case of deﬁnition 1 a recovery is considered to be credit-less if real private credit
growth is negative in t+1,t+2,andt+3 (i.e. in all three years). In the case of deﬁnition
2 a recovery is considered to be credit-less if real private credit growth is negative in both
t+1 and t+2. According to deﬁnition 3 a recovery is credit-less if the average annual real
1The smoothing parameter we set to 6.25 as recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data.12
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credit growth over the period t+1tot+3 is negative. Similarly, in deﬁnition 4 a recovery
is credit-less if the average annual credit growth over the period t +1t ot + 2 is negative.
Finally, in deﬁnitions 5 and 6 recovery is said to be credit-less if the real private credit level
in t is higher than in t + 3 and t + 2, respectively.
2.2 Some Stylised Facts
In this subsection, we examine some key features of credit-less recoveries based on descrip-
tive evidence and take a ﬁrst look at possible determinants of such recoveries. Using the
methodology described above we ﬁnd 211 recoveries in our sample. Table 9 of the Appendix
lists the countries and the associated trough years (i.e. the years preceding the onset of
the recoveries) for our sample. Table 10 of the Appendix presents the number of identiﬁed
credit-less recoveries in our sample for the six deﬁnitions deﬁnitions introduced in the pre-
vious subsection. Deﬁnition 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 identify 12, 23, 48, 46, 54, and 50 credit-less
recoveries, respectively. Ignoring deﬁnition 1 and 2, which are relatively strict, this implies
that more or less every fourth recovery is credit-less. Moreover, the number of credit-less
recoveries that we identify in our sample does not vary much across deﬁnitions 3, 4, 5, and
6. Since deﬁnition 5 identiﬁes the highest number of credit-less recoveries and is very similar
to deﬁnitions used in previous studies we choose it as our preferred deﬁnition.










Figure 1: Number of Credit-less Recoveries (Deﬁnition 5) Starts per Year.
We ﬁnd that credit-less recoveries seem to occur almost in every year of the sample,
although there is substantial variation over time with peak periods clustered around two
or possibly three episodes (see Figure 1). The ﬁrst and clearest peak in the number of
credit-less recoveries took place in the early 1980s following the Latin American debt crisis.13
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The second peak, which is somewhat less pronounced, occurred in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s
and was concentrated mainly (but not only) in European countries. Finally, a third peak
seems to have occurred in the late 1990s following the Asian crisis.
Knowing that credit-less recoveries have indeed ocurred in the past we wonder whether
they are diﬀerent from ”normal” recoveries, i.e., recoveries with credit. Table 2 presents
the average real GDP growth among countries during the ﬁrst three years of ”normal” and
credit-less recoveries as given by deﬁnition 5. Average output growth is 14.2 percent in
the ﬁrst year of a ”normal” recovery whereas it less than half (6.4 percent) in the ﬁrst
year of credit-less recoveries. In the following years output growth in credit-less recoveries
remains lower than output growth in ”normal” recoveries. Output growth during credit-less
recoveries thus tends to be weaker than during ”normal” recoveries.
Observations 1st year 2nd year 3rd year
”Normal” recoveries 157 14.2 5.8 6.0
Credit-less recoveries 54 6.4 3.9 4.1
Table 2: Average annual real GDP growth (in %) during the ﬁrst three years of recoveries
To gain a ﬁrst insight into the determinants of credit-less recoveries, we investigate their
relation with systemic banking and currency crises. In order to do so, we ﬁrst identify
recessions associated with systemic banking or currency crises. The dates of these crises
are obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2008). Recessions are associated with systemic
banking or currency crises if the recession starts at least one year after the systemic banking
or currency crisis, respectively. Table 9 (in the Appendix) presents the recessions associated
with banking crises (trough years are underlined) and to currency crises (trough years in
bold) for each country. Moreover, troughs followed by a credit-less recovery according to
deﬁnition 5 are marked with a star. Looking at Table 3, which summarises this information,
we ﬁnd that every second recession preceded by a banking crisis is followed by a credit-less
recovery. Similarly, a bit less than half of the recessions preceded by a currency crisis
are followed by a credit-less recovery. The occurrence of a twin crisis, i.e., a systemic
banking crisis concurrent with a currency crisis does not increase the frequency of credit-
less recoveries with respect to banking or currency crises alone. Every second recession
preceded by a twin crisis is followed by a credit-less recovery.14
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Nr. of Recoveries Banking Crisis no Banking Crisis total
Credit-less 15 39 54
with Credit 16 141 157
total 31 180 211
Nr. of Recoveries Currency Crisis no Currency Crisis total
Credit-less 14 40 54
with Credit 19 138 157
total 33 178 211
Nr. of Recoveries Twin Crisis no Twin Crisis total
Credit-less 9 45 54
with Credit 8 149 157
total 17 194 211
Table 3: Credit-less Recoveries, Systemic Banking and Currency Crises.
3 Determinants of credit-less Recoveries
3.1 Empirical Model
In order to investigate the determinants and the predictability of credit-less recoveries we
estimate a panel probit model. The use of a probit model and the construction of a binary
credit-less recovery variable are based on our belief that ﬁnancial crises may have non-
linear eﬀects on output, as they trigger substantial declines in capital ﬂows and lead to
balance sheet eﬀects that may result in serious credit constraints. Moreover, this model has
been used to study methodologically similar issues such as current account reversals (see
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) and Liesenfeld et al. (2010)), currency crises (see Falcetti
and Tudela (2006)), ﬁnancial crises (see Canova (1994)) or prolonged inﬂation regimes (see
Vansteenkiste (2009)). It should be emphasised that our model is not a tool that can be
used to forecast recoveries in output. Instead, our aim is to explain and predict the joint
probability of a recovery in output without a pick-up in credit. A recovery in output is
deﬁned here as the phase in the cycle that follows a trough as discussed in more detail in
Section 2.1.15
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itβ +  it (1)
yit = I(yit∗ > 0),i =1 ,...,N, t =1 ,...,T
where I(yit∗ > 0) is an indicator function which transforms the latent variable y∗
it into
a binary variable yit. The latter variable indicates the onset of a credit-less recovery for
country i at time t, i.e., yit = 1. Therefore, we assume that the dependent variables
takes on a value of 1 in the ﬁrst year of the credit-less recovery.2 Moreover, as mentioned
in Section 2.1, we use deﬁnition 5 as our preferred deﬁnition of a credit-less recovery for
the regressions.3 The vector xit contains observed regressors which might be driving the
occurrence of credit-less recoveries. The selection of regressors and how they enter the
model is discussed in the next subsection. The error term  it is assumed to be normally
distributed with zero mean and ﬁxed variance. The model is estimated using data with
annual frequency for data availability reasons. To avoid potential endogeneity issues lagged
explanatory variables are used.
First, we estimate a pooled version of the panel probit model assuming that  it is in-
dependent across time and countries. Since a pooled model is rather restrictive we also
use the random eﬀects model proposed by Butler and Moﬃtt (1982). Introducing random
country-speciﬁc eﬀects allows us to account for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity
across countries. In this model the error term is given by
 it = αi + eit,e it ∼ iidN(0,1),α i ∼ iidN(0,σ2
α). (2)
The time invariant country-speciﬁc eﬀect αi introduces a constant cross-period correlation
of  it that is given by ρ = σα
σα+1.
Within the panel probit framework it is possible to estimate probabilities of onsets of
credit-less recoveries conditional on the explanatory variables, i.e.,
Pr(yit =1 |Xit, ˆ β)=F(X

itˆ β), (3)
where F is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution and ˆ β are
the estimates obtained from equation (1).
2We also experimented with setting the dependent variable equal to 1 in the ﬁrst three years of the
credit-less recovery. The results obtained in those regressions remained very similar.
3Regression results are robust to diﬀerent deﬁnitions.16
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3.2 Explanatory Variables
The selection of explanatory variables in our model is based on the hypothesis that ﬁnan-
cial frictions play a key role during a recovery phase following ﬁnancial crises. A recent
example of such a theoretical model is Dagher (2010), where shocks to trend productivity
can generate a credit-less recovery in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. In this model, a
downward revision to trend growth expectations leads to a decline in ﬁrms’ market value,
which, in turn, restricts their capacity to borrow (particularly if ﬁrms are overleveraged),
but without aﬀecting the de-trended capital level in the economy. Another model that
can explain the dichotomy between output and credit following a sudden stop is the one
in Calvo et al. (2006b). This model shows that a ”liquidity crunch” provoked by a sharp
increase in interest rates can lead to a collapse in output and credit, which is followed by a
recovery in output as ﬁrms restore their liquidity by cutting back on investment. Financial
frictions in this model stem from the fact that ﬁrms can only obtain short-term ﬁnancing
for working capital (e.g. capital to ﬁnance inventory accumulation or international trade),
whereas they have to ﬁnance physical capital with retained earnings (a typical feature of
ﬁnancial systems in emerging economies).
The explanatory variables that we consider combine elements of the above partial mod-
els, while focusing on variables that can signal disruptions in the ﬁnancial intermediation
process or a dependence on international capital ﬂows. More speciﬁcally, we consider two
types of explanatory variables. First, we include variables that contain information on the
recovery in output. Second, we use variables that signal tensions in the ﬁnancial interme-
diation process or a high degree of leverage. variables.
1. Real GDP growth: This variable captures a ”bounce-back” eﬀect, i.e. the deeper the
preceding contraction in economic activity the larger the probability is that output
will recover (see for example Sichel (1994)). GDP can recover more easily after large
contractions in output as unused production capacity remains available. There is
thus no need to invest in (and borrow for) new production capacity in order to satisfy
a recovery in demand. Moreover, ﬁnancial accelerator mechanisms suggest that the
more severe the downturn, the larger the probability that subsequent credit growth
We use the following explanatory17
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may be very weak.
2. Credit-to-GDP ratio: A high (private sector) credit-to-GDP ratio is an indicator of
high indebtedness and thus signals that the private sector may have to deleverage
(especially after a downturn in GDP). A high credit-to-GDP ratio can also indicate
that a credit boom took place (if the ratio increased strongly in the preceding years).
3. Banking crisis dummy: This is our key indicator of ﬁnancial tensions (taken from
Laeven and Valencia (2008)). It typically takes several years after a banking crisis
before bank balance sheets have been cleaned up and banks start to provide new
credit. In addition, the descriptive analysis in this paper and, among others, in Abiad
et al. (2011) suggests that credit-less recoveries are more likely when the downturn is
preceded by a banking crisis.
4. Currency crisis dummy: We include this dummy (taken from Laeven and Valencia
(2008)) for similar reasons as the banking crisis dummy. International investors may
become less willing to invest in countries that experienced a currency crisis in the
recent past. This is potentially important for ﬁnancial intermediation in emerging
markets, in particular if there is no developed domestic market for funding (i.e. no
deposits). Currency crisis are often associated with sudden stops in capital ﬂows,
which, as Calvo et al. (2006a) show, are closely associated with credit-less recoveries.
5. Current account (CA) balance (ratio to GDP): A high current account deﬁcit signals
a large dependence on foreign capital inﬂows, which are typically used to fund the
domestic banking system and domestic spending in emerging markets. Moreover, a
large CA deﬁcit can be an indicator of an unsustainable credit boom. We therefore
expect that the lower the CA balance (or the higher the deﬁcit) is, the higher the
likelihood that the following recovery will be credit-less.
6. Investment growth: Inclusion of this variable is based on the model in Calvo et al.
(2006b), which suggests that ﬁrms cut back on investment to restore their liquidity
once ﬁnancial frictions worsen in the wake of a crisis or sharp downturn.
7. Export growth: This variable may be a key driver of a credit-less recovery if more
credit-intensive domestic expenditure components remain depressed.18
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As mentioned earlier all explanatory variables are lagged by one year to avoid potential
endogeneity problems.
In addition to the above explanatory variables, several other indicators may capture
ﬁnancial constraints or wealth eﬀects and could potentially improve the performance of our
models. Such factors include, for example, interest rates, asset prices and various indicators
of indebtedness. In addition, ﬁscal variables could be relevant as problems at the sovereign
level can aﬀect the ability to borrow of the private sector and could thus prevent credit
from picking up while demand recovers. Finally, variables that capture alternative sources
of (external or domestic) ﬁnancing, such as FDI or trade credit may be useful additional
indicators (regarding trade credit, see in particular Coricelli and Roland, 2011). These
variables have nevertheless not been included in our empirical models largely due to data
constraints. Variables that were available but that are not shown here, such as indicators
of indebtedness for the private or public sector, turned out not to be signiﬁcant.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main Results
First, we estimate a pooled panel probit model4. Table 4 summarizes the ﬁndings. Col-
umn 1 reports the empirical relationship between real GDP growth and the credit-to-GDP
ratio, which we expect to be signiﬁcant determinants based on the deﬁnition of credit-less
recoveries.
a recovery without credit in the next year. Moreover, a high credit-to-GDP ratio increases
the likelihood of a credit-less recovery. In column 2 we add the dummies for currency crises
and banking crises. As the descriptive analysis suggested they are both signiﬁcant determi-
nants of credit-less recoveries. After a recession that was preceded by a currency or banking
crisis the recovery is more likely to be credit-less. Column 3 adds the CA balance as an
indicator of credit-less recoveries. The higher the CA deﬁcit, i.e., the larger the dependence
on foreign capital inﬂows, the higher the likelihood of a credit-less recovery. Finally, column
4The number of countries entering the regressions declines to 72 due to lack of data availability of some
explanatory variables
As expected, countries with high negative growth are more likely to experience19
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Real GDP growth -9.49*** -8.87*** -9.43*** -11.24***
Credit/GDP 0.64*** 0.56** 0.56** 0.67**
Currency Crisis 1.10*** 0.87** 0.90**




Constant -2.11*** -2.24*** -2.31*** -2.33***
Log likelihood -176.93 -149.89 -127.41 -116.31
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.36 0.39 0.43
Table 4: Pooled Panel Probit Estimation. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, ***
signiﬁcant at 1%.
4 reports results for our preferred regression including two components of the national ac-
counts, namely investment and export growth. The probability of experiencing a credit-less
recovery increases in countries with a high negative investment growth and high positive
export growth. Our preferred regression also reaches the highest pseudo-R25.
In order to control for heterogeneity across panel members, we also estimate a panel
probit model using random eﬀects. Table 5 reports the estimation results of this model. All
coeﬃcients have the expected sign and are nearly the same as in the pooled probit model.
The estimates of the correlation ρ and σα are 0.011 and 0.11, respectively. The p-value of
a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis, ρ = 0, is equal to 0.46 implying that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, it seems that the panel-level variance component is
unimportant and the random eﬀects estimator is not diﬀerent from the pooled estimator.
5Since real GDP growth is likely to be correlated with investment growth we run our preferred regression
also excluding real GDP growth. Results remain the same except that the psuedo-R
2 declines, suggesting
that the explanatory power of real GDP growth is high.20
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Real GDP growth -9.49*** -8.87*** -9.43*** -11.32***
Credit/GDP 0.64** 0.56* 0.56* 0.68*
Currency Crisis 1.10*** 0.87** 0.91**




Constant -2.11*** -2.24*** -2.32*** -2.35***
Log likelihood -176.93 -149.89 -127.42 -116.30
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.36 0.39 0.43
Table 5: Random Eﬀects Panel Probit Estimation. * signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%,
*** signiﬁcant at 1%.
4.2 Marginal Eﬀects
The estimated coeﬃcients of the panel probit model do not allow for inference about the
quantitative eﬀects of changes in explanatory variables. Therefore, we calculate the marginal
eﬀects for speciﬁc changes in the regressors. The marginal eﬀects of the covariate k for







itˆ β))ˆ βk, (4)
where f is the derivative of F, i.e., the probability density function of a standard normal
distribution. Typically, the marginal eﬀects are calculated at the means of the explanatory
variables. Nevertheless, derivative calculation might not be meaningful in the case of dummy
variables as regressors. Let Xl denote the dummy explanatory variables and ¯ X the other
explanatory variables at their means. Then, the eﬀect of a change in Xl on the predicted
probabilities of y is calculated as follows.
Pr(y =1 |Xl =1 , ¯ X, ˆ β) − Pr(y =1 |Xl =0 , ¯ X, ˆ β)( 5 )
Table 6 shows the estimated marginal eﬀects of changes in the explanatory variables for our
preferred model (with their standard errors in parenthesis). The size of the marginal eﬀects
shows that in particular a preceding decline in output and the occurrence of a banking crisis
tend to strongly increase the probability of a credit-less recovery.21
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Real GDP growth -0.167*** (0.038)
Credit/GDP 0.009** (0.005)
Currency Crisis 0.042** (0.039)
Banking Crisis 0.101*** (0.042)
CA/GDP -0.025*** (0.009)
Investment growth 0.001* (0.001)
Export growth -0.003* (0.002)
Table 6: Marginal eﬀects of changes in explanatory variables.
5 Predictions
As described in Section 3.1 it is possible to estimate probabilities of credit-less recoveries
for our sample as well as for the years ahead. Therefore, we analyse the accuracy of the
estimated model in predicting the onset of credit-less recoveries for speciﬁc years and coun-
tries. First, we present the estimated probabilities over time for selected countries. Second,
we assess the predictive performance of our model using several statistics. Finally, we pro-
vide predictions of how likely it is for central and eastern European EU Member States to
experience a credit-less recovery in the years ahead. Since the former analysis has shown
that there is no diﬀerence between a pooled or panel estimator we perform predictions using
the pooled model.
First, we present estimated probabilities for the occurrence of credit-less recoveries over
time for some selected Latin American, Asian, and central and eastern European countries6.
Figure 2 in the Appendix shows the predictions over time for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Colombia. A vertical line denotes the start of a credit-less recovery. For Argentina the two
highest peaks (in 1983 and 2003) are associated with estimated probabilities of credit-less
recoveries of 70% and 64%, respectively. Since we indeed identiﬁed credit-less recoveries in
our earlier descriptive analysis in 1983 and 2002, the model thus predicts their occurrence
correctly. However, the estimated probability also peaks in 1996 (although at a lower value),
which implies that for the trough of 1995 we may predict a credit-less even though it did
not occur. Notably, for the other recoveries in the years 1991 and 1986 the estimated
probabilities are relatively low. In the case of Brazil we have two peaks (1984 and 1993) for
6Figures for all countries in our dataset are available from the authors upon request.22
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the estimated probabilities that coincide with the actual occurrence of credit-less recoveries.
Nevertheless, for 1982 we may predict a false positive. In the case of Chile the predictive
performance of the model is very good. For 1984 we predict a credit-less recovery with
80% probability. For Colombia the model predicts the credit-less recovery starting in 2000
correctly and obtains a very low probability for the (normal) recovery in 1993. Figure
3 in the Appendix presents the estimated probabilities for Hungary, Latvia, Poland and
Romania. For Hungary the peak of estimated probabilities in 1992 coincides with the
actual occurrence of a credit-less recovery. The predictions for other years are very low.
In the case of Latvia we observe estimated probabilities close to zero for the entire period
(and there are indeed no credit-less recoveries during the period shown in the chart). For
Poland we estimate probabilities around 8% in 1991 an 1992, with the actual credit-less
recovery starting in 1992. Moreover, the model predicts relatively low probabilities over
time for Romania for which we have not identiﬁed any credit-less recovery. Figure 4 in
the Appendix shows predictions for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. For
these Asian countries the predictive performance of the model seems very strong. While the
predicted probabilities of credit-less recoveries are high when a credit-less recovery actually
occurred, the predictions are low when a credit-less recovery did not take place.
Second, we assess the predictive performance of our model using statistics. The accuracy
of our model is measured using the Brier Quadratic Probability Score (QPS), the Global
Calibration Statistic (GBS), and type I and type II errors. The QPS and GBS statistics





t=1 (Pit − Rit)2 and GBS =2 ( P − R)2,w h e r ePit is the
probability forecast of a credit-less recovery and Rit is the actual realization, i.e., the dummy
variable taking a value of one at the occurrence of a credit-less recovery. ¯ P and ¯ R are their
unconditional means. The two statistics range from zero to two with a zero corresponding
to perfect accuracy. For our estimated model both statistics are close to zero (QPS =0 .038
and GBS =4 .26 ∗ 10−6), implying a good accuracy.
Moreover, we assess the predictive performance of our model by calculating type I
errors, i.e., the average conditional probability of a false alarm (a credit-less is predicted
although it did not occur), and type II errors, i.e., the average conditional probability
of a missing signal (a credit-less recovery is not predicted when it occurred). Evaluating
the predictive performance of an estimated binary model using these errors requires the23
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b b∗=0.027 0.1 0.3 0.5
type I 0.1053 0.0324 0.045 0.0044
type II 0.0455 0.4318 0.568 0.7045
Table 7: Behavior of type I and type II errors for diﬀerent thresholds b
selection of a threshold b, whereby a credit-less recovery is predicted if and only if the
estimated probability is larger than b. Table 7 shows the type I and type II errors for
diﬀerent thresholds. Canova (1994) uses a probability threshold of 50% whereas Liesenfeld
et al. (2010) deﬁne the threshold as the argument b∗ that minimizes the sum of type I and
type II errors. Table 7 summarises the behavior of type I and type II errors for diﬀerent
thresholds. For b∗, the type I and type II errors are very low. The model predicts a credit-
less recovery when it does not occur only with a probability of 10%. The probability of
a missing signal is even lower and equal to 5%. Moreover, the higher the threshold b,t h e
lower the probability of a false alarm and the higher the probability of a missing signal. If
we, for example, set the threshold to 50% the probability of a false alarm is only 0.0044.
This implies that it is very likely that the model predicts credit-less recoveries correctly.
At the same time, however, the probability of missing a signal is also high for such a high
threshold value. In our model, estimated probabilities sometimes peak at a lower level than
0.5 (e.g. Hungary and Brazil). Nevertheless, this may still indicate a high probability of a
credit-less recovery if the estimated probabilities for other years are lower.
Since the accuracy of our binary model seems to be adequate, we apply it to provide
predictions of how likely it is for central and eastern European EU Member States to
experience a credit-less recovery starting in 2010. Table 8 presents the results. Assuming
that the trough in output was reached in 2009 the probability of a credit-less recovery in
central and eastern European EU Member States during the coming years varies across
countries, but is relatively high in the Baltic countries. By contrast, in countries that did
not experience a large contraction in economic activity or less ﬁnancial stress the probability
of a recovery without credit seems substantially lower.24
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Table 8: Estimated predictions of credit-less recoveries for central and eastern European EU
Member States.
6 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the characteristics and particularly the determinants of credit-less
recoveries. After building a dataset and documenting some stylised facts of credit-less recov-
eries in emerging market economies, we use panel probit models to analyse key determinants
of credit-less recoveries. We also apply our preferred model to predict the probability of
credit-less recoveries in central and eastern European EU Member States in the coming
years.
Our main ﬁndings are the following. First, our frequency analysis conﬁrms earlier ﬁnd-
ings that credit-less recoveries are not at all rare events. In our sample of low and middle
income economies one out of four recoveries in output occurs without a pick-up in credit.
Moreover, our analysis shows that the frequency of credit-less recoveries doubles after a
banking or currency crisis. Second, panel probit models suggest that credit-less recoveries
are typically preceded by large declines in economic activity and ﬁnancial stress, in particu-
lar if private sector indebtedness is high and the country is reliant on foreign capital inﬂows.
This suggests that ﬁnancial frictions may indeed play a key role in the stagnation of credit
despite that output recovers. Third and ﬁnally, our models show that (assuming that the
trough in output was reached in 2009) the probability of a credit-less recovery in central
and eastern European EU Member States during the coming years varies across countries,
but is relatively high in the Baltic States.
Our ﬁndings have the following implications. They suggest that a recovery in output25
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following a recession associated with ﬁnancial stress may not be accompanied by a pick-up in
lending. New credit may thus not be a necessary condition for output to recover. This does
not mean, however, that credit is irrelevant for a recovery in output. Credit-less recoveries
tend to be relatively weak and other related research (e.g. Kannan (2010)) shows that
stressed credit conditions contribute to the sluggishness of these recoveries. To the extent
that bottlenecks in the supply of credit play a role, policy measures aimed at supporting
the ﬁnancial intermediation process may help the recovery in output. Such policy measures
should not only focus on the ﬁnancial sector, but also concentrate on restoring conﬁdence
among lenders and savers. A credible ﬁscal consolidation strategy and structural reforms
aimed at correcting the root causes of the macroeconomic imbalances built up in previous
years should play a key role in this regard. Even more important are pre-emptive policies
aimed at avoiding the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances.26
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Figure 2: Estimated probabilities of credit-less recoveries over time for Argentina, Brazil, Chile
and Colombia.




















Figure 3: Estimated probabilities of credit-less recoveries over time for Hungary, Latvia,
Poland and Romania.




















Figure 4: Estimated probabilities of credit-less recoveries over time for Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand.29
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Id Country Trough Years total
1 Albania 1992 1
2 Argentina 1982* 1985 1990 1995 2002*5
3 Bangladesh 1975 1980 1989 3
4 Barbados 1973* 1983 1992 3
5 Belarus 1995 1
6 Belize 1982 1986 1998 3
7 Benin 1974 1979 1983 1989*4
8 Bolivia 1974 1983* 1986 3
9 Botswana 1975 1977* 1987 1996 4
10 Brazil 1983* 1992*2
11 Bulgaria 0
12 Burkina Faso 1984* 1989* 1998 3
13 Burundi 1972* 1975 1979 1984 1996 5
14 Cambodia 1990 1998 2003 3
15 Cameroon 1993* 1
16 Chile 1975 1983*2
17 Colombia 1977 1985* 1992 1999*4
18 Congo, Republic of 1978 1986* 2
19 Costa Rica 1976 1982 1991 1996 4
20 Croatia 1998 1
21 Czech Republic 0
22 Dominica 1979 2002 2
23 Dominican Republic 1985 1991 2004 3
24 Ecuador 1983 1987* 1999*3
25 Egypt 1986 1
26 El Salvador 1989* 1
27 Equatorial Guinea 1993 1
28 Estonia 1995 1999 2
29 Fiji 1983 1988 1991 3
30 Georgia 2002 1
31 Grenada 1996 2001 2004 3
32 Guatemala 1975 1983* 1986 2005 4
33 Guinea-Bissau 1998* 2003 2
34 Honduras 1975 1983 1999* 3
35 Hungary 1985 1991* 2
36 India 1974 1979 2002 3
37 Indonesia 1998*1
38 Iran, I.R. of 1980* 1988 2
39 Israel 1972 1977 2
40 Jamaica 1976* 1980 1986 3
41 Jordan 1985 1991 2
42 Kazakhstan 1998 1
43 Kenya 1976 1978 1984 330
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Id Country Trough Years total
44 Korea, Republic of 1980 1998 2
45 Kuwait 1975 1982 1988 1992 4
46 Latvia 1993* 1
47 Lesotho 1986 1
48 Lithuania 0
49 Macedonia, FYR 2002 1
50 Madagascar 1978 1982* 2002 3
51 Malawi 1990* 1994* 2001 3
52 Malaysia 1975 1986 1998*3
53 Malta 1974* 1987 1994 2004 4
54 Mauritius 1975 1980 1984 3
55 Mexico 1977 1983 1988 1995*4
56 Mongolia 1985 1993 2002 3
57 Morocco 1973 1975 1981 1987 1993 1995 6
58 Nicaragua 1993* 2003 2
59 Niger 1992* 2000 2
60 Nigeria 1972 1
61 Oman 1980 1987 2
62 Pakistan 1972* 1977 1979 2003 4
63 Panama 1976 1988 2
64 Paraguay 1976 1983* 1986 2000* 4
65 Peru 1978 1983* 1990 1992 4
66 Philippines 1985* 2002*2
67 Poland 1982* 1991* 2
68 Romania 1992 2000 2
69 Russian Federation 1994 1998 2
70 Saudi Arabia 1978 1983 1987* 2002 4
71 Senegal 1973 1978* 1981* 1984* 2002 5
72 Slovak Republic 0
73 Slovenia 1992 1
74 Sri Lanka 1977 1982 1996 2002 4
75 Swaziland 1986 1990 2
76 Syrian Arab Republic 1973 1979 1989 3
77 Tanzania 0
78 Thailand 1975 1986 1998*3
79 Togo 1979 1983 1993* 3
80 Trinidad and Tobago 1975 1984* 2002 3
81 Tunisia 1982 1986 1989 1995 4
82 Turkey 1989 1994 2001 3
83 Ukraine 1994* 1
84 Uruguay 1984* 2002* 2
85 Vietnam 1999 1
86 Zambia 1979 1992 1995* 3
total 211
Table 9: Trough Years. A * denotes a trough which is followed by a credit-less recovery (def-
inition 5). Underlined and bold trough years refer to recessions associated with sys-
tematic banking crises and currency crises, respectively.31
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Year Country Id Def. 1 Def. 2 Def. 3 Def. 4 Def. 5 Def. 6
1973 Burundi 13 x
1973 Pakistan 62 x x x x x x
1974 Barbados 4 x x x x x
1974 Syrian Arab Republic 76 x x
1975 Malta 53 x x x x
1977 Jamaica 40 x x x x x x
1978 Botswana 9 x x
1979 Congo 18 x x
1979 Senegal 71 x x x x
1981 Iran 38 x x x x x
1982 Senegal 71 x x
1983 Argentina 2 x x x x x x
1983 Madagascar 50 x x x x x
1983 Poland 67 x x x x x
1984 Barbados 4 x x
1984 Bolivia 8 x x x
1984 Brazil 10 x x
1984 Chile 16 x x
1984 Ecuador 24 x x
1984 Guatemala 32 x x x x
1984 Paraguay 64 x x x x x
1984 Peru 65 x x x x x x
1985 Burkina Faso 12 x x x x
1985 Senegal 71 x x x x x
1985 Trinidad and Tobago 80 x x x x
1985 Uruguay 84 x x
1986 Colombia 17 x x
1986 Phillippines 66 x x x x
1987 Congo 18 x x x x x x
1987 Malaysia 52 x x
1987 Mexico 55 x x
1988 Ecuador 24 x x x x x
1988 Saudi Arabia 70 x
1989 Panama 63 x x
1990 Benin 7 x x x x x x
1990 Burkina Faso 12 x x x x
1990 El Salvador 26 x x x x
1991 Malawi 51 x x x
1992 Hungary 35 x x x x x x
1992 Poland 67 x x x x
1993 Brazil 10 x x x
1993 Niger 59 x x x x x x
1994 Cameroon 15 x x x x x
1994 Latvia 46 x x x x
1994 Nicaragua 58 x x x x
1994 Togo 79 x x x x x
1995 Malawi 51 x x x x x x
1995 Ukraine 83 x x x x x
1996 Mexico 55 x x
1996 Zambia 86 x x
1999 Guinea-Bissau 33 x x
1999 Indonesia 37 x x x x x x
1999 Malaysia 52 x x x x x
1999 Thailand 78 x x x x x x
2000 Colombia 17 x x x x
2000 Ecuador 24 x x
2000 Honduras 34 x x x x
2001 Paraguay 64 x x x x
2002 Malawi 51 x
2003 Argentina 2 x x x
2003 Phillippines 66 x
2003 Uruguay 84 x x x x x x
t o t a l 1 22 34 84 65 45 0
Relative Frequency 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.24
Table 10: Credit-less recoveries according to diﬀerent deﬁnitions (starting year in ﬁrst col-
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